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Abstract: East  Asia  (including  Southeast  and  Northeast  Asia)  has  witnessed  the  most
spectacular pacification in the world during the past 30 years. Certain dimensions related to
human security have been perceived as weak points in the long peace of East Asia. Despite
progress, authoritarian violence is still a reality in East Asia. At the same time, certain other
dimensions  of  human security—most  distinctively  those  elements  related to  "freedom from
want"—have developed very well during the long peace of East Asia. 
This article will study whether the concept of human security constructs realities that are useful
for peace in East Asia. For this, the article will look at how the way in which  "human" and
"security" are linked, serve and deepen the existing social  realities  of peace in the region.
Furthermore, the article will look inside the concepts of  "human" and  "security" to see how
human security is constructed and whether the construction serves to deepen the long peace of
East  Asia.  The  article  will  argue  that  the  East  Asian  human security  debate  could  be  an
intellectual adaptation strategy useful for the promotion of the long peace of East Asia in a
deeper sense.
Keywords: constructivism; East Asia; Human Security; long peace of East Asia; post-
structuralism; speech acts
1. Context, Aims and Objectives
East  Asia  (including  Southeast  and  Northeast  Asia)
has witnessed a spectacular pacification in the world
during the past 30 years. If we compare the period
from the end of World War II  until  the end of the
1970s with the period after that, we can see a virtual
disappearance of battle deaths in traditional interstate
conflicts (decline of over 99%), a drastic reduction in
battle deaths during domestic conflict (almost 40%),
and  a  substantial  reduction  in  number  of  conflicts.
Furthermore,  violent  repression  has  decreased  and
governments have become more constrained in the
use of power on their citizens. As a result, one-sided
© 2014 by the authors; licensee Librello, Switzerland. This open access article was published 
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violence by armed groups  or  the state  against un-
armed  people  is  also  on  the  decline.  Even  violent
crime seems to be on the decline [1].
Despite  progress,  authoritarian  violence  is  still  a
reality in East Asia. More than two thirds of the pop-
ulation  live  under regimes that  place only  slight  to
moderate  limitations  on  executive  authority.  This  is
the  main  issue  where  the  long  peace  of  East  Asia
needs deepening. One could also say that peace in
East  Asia  should  move  from  negative  to  positive
peace  [2]  by  establishing  institutions  that  could
ensure a lasting peace and the formation of an East
Asian  security  community.  This  prospect  is  under
investigation in this article. At the same time, certain
other  dimensions  of  human  security—most  distinc-
tively  those  elements  related  to  "freedom  from
want"—have  developed  very  well  during  the  long
peace of East Asia. Peace in the sense of an absence
of wars (negative peace) has been built upon a eco-
nomic  development-oriented  conflict  management
which, as a by-product, had already lifted over 400
million  Chinese  out  of  poverty  by  the  end  of  the
second decade of  the long peace of  East  Asia [3].
Despite critics that say that freedom from want is still
an unrealistic goal, and that economic development
should be sustainable—which it has not always been
in East Asia—it is important to acknowledge this side
of human security: economic development has been a
huge contribution to human welfare in East Asia, even
if  the  region  should  now aim  at  making  economic
development more ecologically sustainable.
The aim of this article is to review the East Asianist
human security debate and see if the concept of hu-
man security could reconcile some of the weaknesses
of the long peace of East Asia. For this the article will
look at a) the contents of the two concepts, "human"
and  "security",  b)  at  what  kinds  of  human  security
concepts  the  East  Asian  concept  competes  against
(and replaces if successful), and c) at the way in which
"human" and  "security" are linked.  While  looking at
what human security can offer to the long peace of
East Asia, this article will not claim or study the causal
connection between the concept and the long peace.
By East Asianist debate I mean, first,  the author-
itative  public  documents  on  human  security,  mainly
authored by the Japanese government and the ASEAN
secretariat; second, the East Asian debate consisting of
writings by Japanese scholars, especially  those facil-
itated by  the  Tokai  University,  such as Yusuke Dan,
Kazuo  Tase,  Keizo  Takemi,  Tatsuro  Matsumae,  Akira
Enoki  and  Akiko  Fukushima;  and  third,  the  East
Asianist debate having been lead by the great Asian
theorists,  Amitav  Acharya,  Surpong  Peou,  Chung-in
Moon, Mely Caballero-Anthony, Mohamed Jawhar bin
Hassan, Evelyn Goh, Yu-tai Ts'ai, and many others.
2. How Should the Human Security Concept Be 
Assessed?
Since  the  critical  security  study's  introduction,  the
concept  of  human security  has spun off  very inter-
esting  theoretical  discussions  on  security.  But  these
theoretically  interesting  debates  have  not  been  re-
stricted to the original critical studies or to the newer
Copenhagen School approaches. The East Asian debate
has also been theoretically innovative and interesting.
However,  the  East  Asian  debate  has  not  been  very
explicit or reflective about the use of theoretical con-
cepts.  The  debate  has  not  gone  back  to  the  foun-
dations that could legitimize a concept. This is why I
think it could be interesting to make an interpretation
of the explicit foundations that could justify the East
Asian usage of the concept of human security.
If we look at what was defined as the East Asian
debate  on  human security  at  the  beginning  of  this
paper,  one can see  a clear  commitment  to  a  prag-
matic,  empiricist  effort  to  relate  concepts  to  some-
thing  real  and  concrete  in  East  Asia.  According  to
Peou  [4]:  "If  human security  is  to  stay  analytically
useful as a concept that can be operationalized and
relevant in policy terms, we need to prioritize policy
commitment, motivate policy action, and assess policy
outcomes." Thus Peou sees the truth of  human se-
curity  as  crucially  dependent  on  the  pragmatic  con-
sequences of it as an adaptation strategy to reality, or
even  as  a  conceptual  construct  of  social  reality.
Furthermore,  Peou  [4]  also  assesses  the  concept  of
human security from the point of view of whether or
not it can be "sold" to the policy community: "My hope
is  that  the  concept  …  can  be  better  accepted  and
applied  if  we  succeed  in  building  a  concept  that  is
neither  too  elastic  nor  too  restrictive,  combining
theoretical insights into one that is neither too parochial
nor too eclectic." While it would be possible to say that
the concept has already been adopted by the policy
community—in 2014 the concept turned 20 years old
and it has been adopted and used in agencies of the
UN, EU and other political organizations—the practice
of human security is always dependent on how much it
has been socialized in societies and how high priority it
gets in policy-making [5].
In addition, the merits of considering something as
a  security  issue  area  are  thought  of  in  the  East
Asianist debate as a matter of practicality. The original
ideas  of  the  securitization  theory  [6]  have  been
criticized  in  the  East  Asian  debate  for  their  lack  of
empirical focus, for the disinterest in real policy conse-
quences and the unintended effects of securitization
[7–9].
All  this  sounds  much  like  the  teachings  of  the
pragmatists [10,11] who rejected concepts and theo-
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ries  as explanations of  reality,  and truths as mirror
images of reality. Instead, they saw knowledge as a
pragmatic strategy of adaptation to and manipulation
of the surrounding world [12,13]. If we take the idea
that knowledge is a building block of the social reality
we live in (as constructivist say) seriously, pragmatic
attitude  to  this  truth  makes  the  articulation  of
interpretations strategic activity. As Chalk said, prag-
matic  research  should  therefore  study  knowledge
production, such as the introduction of the concept of
human  security,  as  strategic  symbolic  creation  of
social  realities  in  interaction between articulators  of
interpretations  and  their  audiences.  Symbolic  inter-
actionalism [14] that studies this interaction does not
just  analyse  which  constructs,  created  by  symbolic
interaction, exist; it is also interested in studying the
actual  "symboling",  the manipulation of  symbols  by
active  persons,  defining  and  redefining  their  social
realities  [15].  Thus  the  articulation  of  "human
security" can be judged as a rhetorical strategy on the
basis of how it advises us to adjust to the social and
material  realities  that  surround  us  and  to  change
conflict-prone structures and processes. In this article
the criterion is how successful it is in creating realities
that help the long peace of East Asia. From the point
of view of an intellectual, the question is also whether
it  is  realistic  to  expect  that  the  concept  will  be
accepted  among  the  policy  community.
According  to  Chaim  Perelman,  Olbrechts-Tyteca
[16]  and  the  theorists  of  the  new  rhetoric  [17],
political  argumentation  is  based  on  the  effort  to
associate the policies one tries to promote with some
policies  about  which  one's  audience  already  feels
generally  positive,  and  to  dissociate  one's  projects
from those of which one's audience disapproves. Enos
puts it thus:  "To create one's rhetorical structure of
reality … is to make use of a structure to establish a
solidarity  between  accepted  judgments  and  others
which one wishes to promote [18]." This is what the
proponents of human security are doing by concretely
linking  "human" and  "security" in one concept. They
are creating a rhetorical association between human
well-being (survival in tolerable conditions in absence
of  want  and  fear  [19,20]),  and  security,  often  the
dominant security concept; that of national security.
This is done in order to associate human well-being
(something that one wants to promote) with national
security,  which,  in our pre-agreements of argumen-
tation (something that the audience already accepts
as  truth  or  as  a  norm),  is  undeniably  regarded  as
something crucially valuable. Thus, the priority on the
survival of national sovereignty is also claimed as vital
to human survival/well-being.
How the association between human welfare and
security is made is crucial for the pragmatic value of
the reality of  "human rights" (association): does the
introduction of human welfare into the security realm
affect  the  way  in  which  traditional  security  is  con-
structed or does it just change the way in which hu-
man welfare is seen. Since human security concept is
a  discursive/argumentative  strategy,  what  kind  of
conceptualization  East  Asian  human  security  is  in-
tended to  replace  needs to  be  studied strategically.
Furthermore,  the  type of  human values  included  in
the issue area to be securitized is important. What is
inside the concept of human security (human rights or
economic  development,  for  example)  is  also  highly
relevant, as is the political context in which the East
Asian concept of human security is articulated. Thus I
will now move on to the examination of the pragmatic
value for the long peace of East Asia by investigating
the implications of the content of "human" and "secu-
rity," the role of the East Asian concept as a substitute
of  the  European  idea  of  human  security,  and  the
implications of the way in which the two concepts are
linked. 
3. The Content of East Asian Concept of Human 
and Security
While  the idea of  human security  can be traced far
back  into  the  history  of  Western  thought  [21]  the
actual term was launched into political terminology by
an Asian intellectual,  Mahbub ul  Haq, in the UNDP's
Human Development Report of 1994. The concept was
first introduced in an extensive, development-empha-
sizing form that now is seen as "the Asian version" of
the concept. The concept presents five new commonly
accepted elements to security thinking.
First, all  human security thinking is based on the
concerns of human beings; either as individuals or as
a humanity. As the Japanese government puts it, any
policy guided by a concern for human security  "puts
people at the center of concerns" (the "human" part)
and  "emphasizes benefiting people who are exposed
to threats" (the "security" part) [22,23]. Putting value
on  human  survival  and  well-being  is  the  first  nor-
mative  basic  premise  of  the  concept  of  human se-
curity. The types of human values seen as belonging
to the scope of security are debated. While survival is
accepted  by  all  proponents  of  human  security,  the
East Asian debate often also defines a wide variety of
values related to human well-being and freedom as
security concerns [24,25]. Instead of going into the
debate  on whether  the  concept  loses  its  normative
relevance  if  it  distances  itself  too  much  from  its
survivalist core, I will simply focus on those definitions
that do indeed stay close to this core.
Second, threats to and the aim for human security
are  not  only  national,  as  is  the  case  with  national
security, but transnational [26]. The assumption that
the sender and the target of threats can be not only
national, but also transnational or sub-national, is the
first  common  ontological  premise  of  all  human  se-
curity  thinking.  The  transnational  nature  of  human
security means, on the one hand, that the source of a
threat  is  not  always  an  intentional,  national  agent.
While  national  security  challenges  are  posed  by
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intentional  actors—mostly  nation-states,  but  some-
times also alliances of several nations—human secu-
rity challenges can be posed by non-actors, such as
climate  change  or  viruses.  These  kinds  of  threats
exist in absence of "enemies." In some cases, human
security  threats  are  posed  by  actors  that  the  inter-
national  community  refuses  to  consider  legitimate,
such as criminals and terrorists. This is problematic for
security  theory,  which often creates models  that as-
sume bargaining between the sender and the target of
a security threat. Security actors never negotiate with
viruses or the ozone layer, and rarely with criminals or
terrorists.
Furthermore,  the  transnational  nature  of  human
security means that while national security in its clas-
sical form means the absence of a threat to one nation
from another (and is therefore inter-national), human
security challenges such as environmental degradation,
hunger  or  authoritarian  violence  can  be  local  ones
(such as flooding in a river delta), national ones (such
as human rights violations), transnational ones (such
as drought in a region covering parts of several states),
or global ones (such as climate change).
Third, human security thinking also assumes that
threats  may be of  a  different sort  from those pre-
viously  seen.  While  traditional  security  thinking has
focused on military threats, human security thinking
complements  this  thought  by  pointing  out  non-
military, soft threats, such as the problems of nation-
building, famine, antagonistic feelings between ethnic
entities, etc. Chung-in Moon and Edward Azar gave
form to theories based on this difference, linking it to
the  realities  of  the  third  world.  They  criticize  the
traditional  military  view for  its  overexposure  to  the
realities  of  the  developed  world  [27].  According  to
Azar and Moon, the  "software" side of the security
problematic in the Third World is more important "as
opposed  to  the  traditional  Western  analyses  of
security, which tend to concentrate on the 'hardware'
side  of  the  problem." This  broad  view  of  the  soft
versus hard nature of threats is the second common
ontological premise on which human security thinking
rests.
Fourth,  some theorists  also say that the logic of
human security is fundamentally different from that of
national security. In the latter, self-help is the main
mode of action, while the former is concerned with
helping  others  "other-help",  [4].  The  need  to  go
beyond the partisan principles of self-help is the first
common praxiological premise of the human security
concept.  A  focus  on  the  well-being  of  the  weakest
individuals in national development cooperation policies
would  make  it  difficult  to  reduce  human  security
operations to the traditional  logic  of  self-help.  Alter-
natively, if one thinks of the referent object of human
security  as all  of  humankind,  one could conceive of
human security as humanity's self-help.
Finally,  while  traditional  security  threats  can  be
seen as being tackled by military response (however,
many traditional security threats nowadays are tackled
by  what  is  now  being  called  civilian  crisis  man-
agement),  the  remedy  for  human  security  threats
might not be military, but can, as the Human Devel-
opment  Report  of  1994  suggests,  be  development.
The broader approach to tackling security threats is
the  second  common  strategic  principle  of  human
security. The inter-departmental, multi-agency nature
of responses to human security challenges has played
a central role in putting human security into effect in
the Japanese government's evaluation of the UN Trust
Fund  for  Human  Security.  According  to  the  eval-
uation’s  definition,  the  Trust  Fund  "promotes  main-
streaming the human security concept in UN agencies,
and it stimulates multi-sector and multi-agency activ-
ities of the UN agencies based on issues beyond the
mandate of each agency. This leads to mainstreaming
the  concept  of  human security  not  only  in  the  UN
agencies, but also in the member countries and civil
society." [28,29].
However, in addition to concepts in common, the
interpretation  of  human  security  has  many  differ-
ences. Many of these differences cut across the divide
between the "West" and East Asia. For some (mostly
Western)  theorists,  the  focus  on  human beings  re-
places the focus on national security while for others
(mostly  East  Asian  scholars),  national  security  is
instrumental to human security. The role of the state
as a threat to or an instrument of human security is a
fundamental alternative ontological premise of human
security.
Many Western approaches to the enlargement of
the security concept—such as critical security studies
and human security—are contrasted with the narrow
national security view. Booth, , Krause, Williams and
Betts  &  Eagleton-Pierce  [30],  for  example,  frame
human  security  more  in  alternative  than  comple-
mentary terms, emphasizing how often states kill their
own people instead of defending themselves [30–33].
Rudolph Rummel  shows conclusive  data  for  this  by
pointing to the fact that governments kill more than
six times as many of their own citizens as do intra-
state and interstate wars put together [34]. According
to Andrew Mack "the realist paradigm is incapable of
dealing  with  the  threat  states  pose  to  their  own
citizens. This is the primary reason why proponents of
human security  argue that  the  individual  should  be
the referent object of security." [35].
On the level  of  policy debate, Canada represents
the extreme end of the spectrum at which the human
security concept is mainly reserved for intrusive inter-
ventions for the sake of the well-being of individuals
against  states that  cannot  or  will  not  secure them.
According  to  a  Senior  Policy  Advisor  in  the  Peace-
building and Human Security Division of the Canadian
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
[36], the two main proofs of the effects on policy of
the  concept  of  human  security  are  the  banning  of
landmines and the establishment of the International
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Criminal  Court,  both  acts  that  went  against  states'
sovereignty.
In the East Asian debate on human security, the
instrumentalist  concept  is  the  mainstream one.  Ac-
cording to this view, states are instruments (but not
the only ones)  of  human security  and thus national
security is also important for human security [4,37,38].
Barry Buzan echoes East Asian logic by criticizing the
reductionist notion of human security [39].
This is  why in the East Asian debate human se-
curity is seen as threatened especially in the context
of state collapse [37,38]. The Japanese sponsored UN
Council  for  Human  Security  reveals  its  pro-state
orientation by placing a special  focus on people on
the move, that is, people who cannot attain security
via the protection of their own states. With the con-
cept of human security, national security also receives
new justifications: "when we focus on the security of
the human persons, of the individuals, we're making
sure  that  state  security  and  state  sovereignty  are
effectively  implemented  to  help,  to  protect,  to
promote the welfare, the well-being and the dignity
security of their own people …" [40].
A  derivative  of  the  debate  on  the  relationship
between national and human security is the question
of  the  relationship  between  sovereignty  and  the
principle  of  non-interference  on the one hand,  and
human  security  on  the  other.  If  states,  especially
authoritarian ones, present threats to human security,
most  Western  approaches  claim  that  sovereignty
should not be allowed to restrict activity (especially by
democracies) to guarantee human security. However,
if states are a crucial instrument of human security as
is often believed in East Asia, sovereignty should not
be compromised. These two views are the first main
alternative strategic premises of human security. The
fact  that  an  intrusive  Western  interpretation  was
perhaps  more  prominent  originally  meant  that  the
concept of human security got a slow start  in East
Asia. Despite the activity of the Japanese (and Korean
and  Philippine)  government  and  the  former  Thai
foreign minister and former ASEAN Secretary General,
Dr. Surin Pitsuwan, accepting the concept of human
security,  it  has  not  been easy  for  East  Asian  intel-
lectuals, let alone for governments [40]. According to
Paul  Evans,  "East  Asia  is  resistant  to  concepts  of
security that, in normative terms, have the potential
to  erode  traditional  concepts  of  sovereignty" [41].
The  human  security  concept  that  East  Asia  sym-
pathizes  with  the  most  is  one  where  sovereignty
cannot  be  compromised,  as  it  is  an  instrument  of
national  security  and thus an important  element  in
human  security:  "the  human  security  concept  is  a
rather comprehensive concept,  but it  will  not be in
competition  with  the  issue  of  state  sovereignty.  In
fact,  it  is  making  the  state  sovereignty  more
meaningful" [40].  This  deviation  from the  Western
discourse is understandable taken the differences in
historical  experiences  of  East  Asia  and  the  West.
While the last big war in Europe was diagnosed as a
result of extreme nationalism and thus security was
associated with lowering state borders, in East Asia,
the  two  biggest  wars  (Vietnam  and  Korea)  were
experiences where intervention and interference mag-
nified  the  impact  on  humans  of  the  war.  In  these
differing historical  contexts it  is  understandable that
the  Western  concept  of  peace  and  human  security
prescribes  the  lowering  of  borders,  while  the  East
Asian prescription is  to the opposite  [42].  If  we go
further back in history, we also encounter the impact
of colonialism on the East Asian interest in the pro-
tection  of  sovereignty.  The  hesitance  of  East  Asian
countries  to  accept  Western  concepts  that  could
legitimize Western interference in the domestic affairs
of East Asian nations is understandable against this
historical background. To some extent also Japan has
in some countries been perceived as a "semi-colonial"
power due to the history of colonialism and expan-
sionism during the Second World War,  and as such
Japan  has  not  been  a  perfect  advocate  for  the
concept of human security.
While the disagreement on the role of the state as
an instrument of or as a threat to human security is
most distinct in political security issues, such as the
question of human rights, it is a relevant divide also in
questions  related  to  economic  human  security.
However  the  divide  between  supporters  and
opponents  of  income-distribution-sensitive  develop-
ment  strategies  does  not  cut  across  the  divide
between the West and East Asia. East Asian capitalist
as well as socialist discourse often criticizes Western
approaches that  are not interested in the economic
security  of  the  state  or  individual  poor  people,  but
instead, are driven by individual  greed. A good ex-
ample of  the capitalist  critique can be found in the
recent  discourse  on  moderation  in  world  affairs  by
Malaysia's  prime  minister  Najib  Razak  [43,44].  This
discourse does not emphasize only economic human
security  of  individuals,  but  that  of  the  nation.  Lee
Jones interprets this emphasis, not only in Malaysia,
but in the entire Southeast Asia, as an emphasis of
the  interests  of  the  class  of  capital  owners.  The
emphasis on the interests of the "national economy",
rather  than  economic  human  security  of  the  poor,
simply shows the class foundation of  the Southeast
Asian  states  [45].  Radical  [46]  and  developmental
[47]  socialist  critique  of  the Western economic  pol-
icies,  again,  criticizes both the class-based capitalist
economic prioritization as well as the neglect of the
economic  human security  of  the  poor  in  the  West.
While in the former the subject of economic human
security was the class of the proletariat, in the latter,
despite  of  the  original  rhetoric  (by  Deng,  for  ex-
ample),  not  the  worker,  but  the  entire  national
economy. In reality, however, the collectivist approach
to economic human security has made it easy for the
East  Asian  states  occasionally  also  to  neglect  their
poor.
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Another important divide between East Asian and
Western  concepts  of  human  security  is  the  greater
focus of East Asian (and, actually, Northern European)
concepts on economic security. The view that human
security can mainly be preserved through political and
developmental  means is the second main alternative
strategic premise of human security. While the Western
human security  concept  has  often  been  focused  on
political freedoms [21,36], the Asian concept is more
closely tied to development. The Unit for Human Se-
curity at the UN Office for the Coordination of Human-
itarian  Affairs  takes  a  middle  road  including  both
political  and  developmental  means  in  the  menu  of
strategic choices for human security.  "Human security
threats cannot be tackled through conventional mech-
anisms alone. Instead, they require a new consensus
that  acknowledges  the  linkages  and  the  interde-
pendencies between development, human rights and
national security" (emphasis added).
The link between development and security in the
East  Asian  debate  is  sometimes  seen  as  a  causal
association from development to security [19]: that is
to  say,  without  development  it  is  not  possible  to
achieve security. This is very much the view that is
repeated in the inaugural documents of ASEAN [48].
Sometimes the association is seen to go in the other
direction.  President  Beningno  S.  Aquino  III  sum-
marized  this  view  in  the  13th  ASEAN  Summit  as
follows:  "The Philippines views regional security as a
valuable element in the evolving Asian architecture. 
The preservation of peace and stability in our region is
an imperative if  we are to continue to prosper and
develop." [49]. Finally, the concepts of human security
and comprehensive security have conceptually bound
security  and  development  together  as  one complex
approach.  According to  the  blueprint  of  the  ASEAN
Political-Security Community: "The APSC subscribes to
a comprehensive approach to security, which acknowl-
edges  the  interwoven relationships  of  political,  eco-
nomic,  social-cultural  and  environmental  dimensions
of development." [50]. This conception is increasingly
common in East Asian rationalization of peace; peace
is needed for investments, which again are needed for
prosperity. It is not possible to speak of positive peace
in the absence of development.
In  short,  the  main  positions  of  the  Western  and
East Asian human security debates are summarized as
follows (Table 1).
Differences in definitions of human security persist.
The two main differing points at which the East Asian
debate needs to defend its position are related to the
way in which national and human security relate to
each other, and to the role of economic well-being in
the content of human security.
Table 1. Common and Differing Positions on Human Security.
Western debate East Asian debate
Normative premise The concept of national security is 
insufficient, as the security of human 
beings is valuable as such, too.
The concept of national security is 
insufficient, as the security of human 
beings is valuable as such, too.
Nature of threat Senders and targets of security threats
are not only national, but also sub-
national, transnational and global. 
Senders and targets of security threats 
are not only national, but also sub-
national, transnational and global.
Nature of threat In addition to military threats, soft 
non-military threats, such as famine or 
lacking governance can threaten 
individuals.
In addition to military threats, soft non-
military threats, such as famine or 
lacking governance can threaten 
individuals.
Nature of threat States are often threats to, rather than
instruments of, human security.
Generally, nations are an instrument of 
human security. Thus national security is 
an instrument of human security.
Approach to security The narrow concept of self-help has to 
be broadened when dealing with 
threats to human security.
The narrow concept of self-help has to 
be broadened when dealing with threats 
to human security.
Approach to security Military means are insufficient in the 
promotion of human security.
Military means are insufficient in the 
promotion of human security.
Approach to security Human security needs to be tackled 
mainly as a political issue.
Human security should be tackled mainly
as a developmental issue.
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4. The Battle between Alternative Contents of 
Human Security
The main debate in terms of the definition of human
security between East Asia and the West is related to
the balance between political and economic values as
issue areas to be securitized. While the UNDP defines
human security  as freedom from fear  and freedom
from want,  the  East  Asian  consensus  can  only  be
found relating to the latter [37]. To some degree, the
Asian association of human security with development
is historically determined. The first time an East Asian
government endorsed the concept was right after the
Asian economic crisis.  At that time, Foreign Minister
(later Prime Minister) Keizo Obushi emphasized com-
passion  in  the  aftermath  of  an  economic  crisis  and
called it an important element in the development of
"human safety". Later, his terminology changed and he
integrated  his  thinking  with  the  human  security
terminology of the UNDP [51].
However, the most prominent explanation for the
economy-based definition of human security is related
to the overall  "developmentalist" security thinking in
the East Asian security debate [52]. "National security
is often perceived to include the security and welfare
of  the state and the people" [53].  Development in
general has been seen as central to the prevention of
conflicts since the time of President Magsaysay in the
Philippines,  and  as  the  theoretical  basis  of  devel-
opmental  security  thinking  within  the  spheres  of
traditional security in Indonesia's President Suharto's
concepts of national resilience, Deng Xiaoping's con-
cept  of  security  though  the  four  modernizations,
Korea's  Prime  Minister  Lee's  administration  Global
Korea  Vision and  Japan's  Prime  Minister  Masayoshi
Ohira's  doctrine on  Comprehensive Security [54].  If
traditional  national  security  has  already  been  asso-
ciated with development, then it is no miracle that the
same is true of human security.
In general,  a  developmentalist  orientation to  hu-
man  security  is  in  line  with  the  overall  East  Asian
orientation to security  and the purpose of states.  I
have shown this by first defining criteria for a devel-
opmentalist  orientation  and  ranking  East  Asian
regimes according to these criteria into three cate-
gories. Then I looked at how a developmentalist orien-
tation  has  been  associated  with  success  in  conflict
prevention (through examining conflict fatalities). Ac-
cording to my findings it seems that the discourse on
development  is  significantly  associated  with  peace
[52].  Rather  than  claiming  a  causal  association  be-
tween  exogenous  variables,  this  shows  that  peace-
fulness  and  a developmental  orientation  are  part  of
one  approach  or  discourse  which  values  peace  and
sees the promotion of economic development as an
important task and identifying quality of states.
In some East Asian countries, the foundation for a
regime's  legitimacy  has  consisted  of  development,
rather  than  democratic  credentials.  In  this  setting,
one might think that an emphasis on  "freedom from
want" as a matter of security would downgrade the
priority  of  democracy.  For  example,  demonstrations
are  sometimes  suppressed  in  China,  Singapore,
Vietnam, and previously in Suharto's Indonesia; seen
as something harmful to foreign investments and thus
economic  development—and  security.  In  this  way,
economic  human  security  could  serve  repression  in
the name of overall security. However, if one looks at
associations  between  democracy,  developmentalism
and  peace,  it  seems  that  developmentalism  is  no
longer part of a discursive package that is seen as an
alternative  to  the  discourse  of  democracy.  On  the
contrary, a regression analysis of democracy (as per
measures from the Polity IV data), developmentalism,
and  conflict  fatalities  show  that  developmentalism,
rather  than  being  an  alternative  foundation  for  a
regime's  legitimacy,  has  recently  become  part  of  a
"modern package" in which democracy and develop-
mentalism are positively associated [52,55].  The role
of the state has become the promotion of modernity
along with economic development and democracy. The
discourse on modernity has thus linked freedom from
want with democracy, instead of seeing developmental
needs  as  security  issues  that  can  be  used  against
democracy  as  justifications  of  authoritarian  violence.
This is especially clear in the debate on human security,
while  the  debate  on  "non-traditional  security" as  an
alternative to human security often tends to see the
realization of development goals, rather than individ-
ualistic  democratic  principles,  as  legitimizing for  East
Asian  states  [56].  Thus,  economic  human  security
serves  the  political  purpose  of  promoting  the  long
peace  of  East  Asia  without  seriously  increasing  the
risk of authoritarian violence, even though "non-tradi-
tional security" has a more dubious relationship with
democracy.
While  democracy  and  developmentalist  human
security concepts are associated today, the total lack
of a priority on development/security tends to be the
case in countries  that  are the least democratic  and
that have the most authoritarian violence. Of all East
Asian countries,  only in  North Korea and in Burma/
Myanmar is the priority on security clearly separated
from  developmental  priorities.  In  these  countries,
national security interests can thus justify policies that
are suicidal  from the point of view of  development.
The lifting of the priority on human economic survival
to a par with national security priorities could there-
fore greatly reduce human suffering, but whether it
would  increase  East  Asian  peace,  is,  of  course,  a
matter  of  definition.  A  true  example  from  Burma's
Chin State illustrates the potential effects.
During  the  time  of  famine  in  the  Chin  State  of
Burma/Myanmar  in  2007‒2008,  villages  with  stock-
piles  of  rice could not  effectively  offer  their  surplus
rice to villages in areas where rice had been destroyed
by rats, due to troop movements in the area which
had  forced  villagers  to  help  with  transportation  of
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ammunition.  Furthermore,  due to the risk of  exter-
nally  instigated  subversion  and  espionage,  foreign
organizations could not be allowed to move freely in
the area to help the starving people [57). If Burma/
Myanmar's government had framed famine as a hu-
man security threat—if it had securitized human well-
being—the  argument  that  the  overriding  threat  to
national security was a justification for inaction in the
face  of  famine  could  not  have  been  presented.  If
famine was also a security matter, the Burmese army
could not have been insensitive to the human costs of
securing the border by means of ammunition deliv-
eries  to  prevent  foreign  intrusion  into  its  territory.
While promoting the political side of human security
could be useful for East Asia, it is the promotion of
the  economic  side  that  is  more  likely  to  bear  fruit
there.  Governments  that  have a poor  human rights
record can be brutal to their challengers, while gov-
ernments where national security enables economically
suicidal policies are murderous to all citizens.
The emphasis on freedom from want in the East
Asian concept of human security and comprehensive
security also has political power implications. On the
one hand,  the  centrality  of  development  has  given
rise  to  economic  technocrats,  who  are  no  longer
considered to be ordinary members of the bureauc-
racy, but instead to be experts central to security. At
least in  Indonesia,  the role  of  the  "Berkeley Mafia"
became central under Suharto's rule and something
similar  could  be  seen  from the  1960s  in  Thailand.
Economic technocrats have also become central in the
Chinese administration after Deng Xiaoping's consol-
idation of power. Furthermore, due to the centrality of
development for security, the Indonesian military had
to assume a central role in the economy: if economy
was central  to stability and only the army could be
trusted, the army had to be a strong control over the
economy, too. The dual (military and economic) roles
of the militaries and the centrality of military officials
in big companies in authoritarian regimes in East Asia
have  often  been  unintended  consequences  of  the
securitization of development. In the long run, it has
meant that, especially in Indonesia, the military has
received only a small fraction of its income from the
public  sector,  while  the  majority  of  its  funding has
come from military businesses. This meant that until
the collapse of 1998, the economy had to be highly
regulated by licenses and permits so that the military-
controlled  public  sector  could  exercise  control  over
economic  development.  Only  in  this  way  could  the
military force its share out of companies and keep it
meaningful for bigger companies to keep military men
on their boards in order to ensure that the licenses
necessary for business would be forthcoming [58,59].
While this has not helped economic development, it
has made it impossible for the Indonesian bureauc-
racy  and  politicians  to  make  economically  suicidal
decisions; development and the economic interests of
the military always had to be a factor in all policies.
The lack  of  political  substance  in  the  East  Asian
human security  concept  relates  to  the  authoritarian
history of East Asian states. It would be difficult for
countries  that  use  repression  of  citizens'  political
rights as a political power strategy to accept a security
concept that could bring political rights on a par with
urgent national security priorities. Yet one could claim
that  in  an  area  where  the  world's  most  genocidal
regimes  in  absolute  (Cultural  Revolution  China,  and
China  during  the  Great  Leap  Forward)  and  relative
(fatalities/population) terms (Pol Pot's Cambodia) can
be  found  [34],  one  could  assume  that  raising  the
priority on the political rights of citizens could prove a
significant contribution to the long peace of East Asia.
If one looks at the political debate on human se-
curity [60], it seems clear that the Japanese offensive
in  the  promotion  of  human  security  did  not  only
intend and manage to promote economic human se-
curity thinking in East Asia, but that it also contributed
to the pre-emption of the much more radical Canadian
concept of human-rights-focused human security. In
this  sense,  the  contribution  of  East  Asian  human
securitization  could  be  framed  against  other  possi-
bilities. A realist might perhaps say that the Japanese
initiative was more realistic as there could never be
political  support  among  East  Asian  authoritarian
regimes for a politically oriented human security con-
cept.  Successful  securitization  of  a  politically  loaded
human security concept would perhaps have been un-
realistic. Yet, if such a concept were more fruitful from
the point of view of pragmatism, there would be no
excuse for governments to challenge it.
5. How are "Human" and "Security" Linked in 
the East Asian Debate?
The association between human well-being and na-
tional security can be made in several ways. The new
issue area that is being introduced into the security
realm can be seen as the authentic origin of all secu-
rities. Alternatively, it can be seen as something equal
to national security. Finally, it can also be introduced
as  something  that  is  important,  but  instrumentally
subordinate to, national security.
In critical security studies of Booth [32], Smith [31]
and Betts & Eagleton-Pierce [30] the state is implicitly
seen  as  valuable  only  through  its  effect  on  the
security  of  its  citizens.  In  these  writings  human
security  is  used  as  the  yardstick,  and  since  many
states are seen as poor instruments of human well-
being, national security is not a valuable concept, and
human security is presented as an alternative.
However,  this  is  not  the  way  that  human  and
national security concepts are linked in the East Asian
debate. Peou  [4]  expresses  his  East  Asian  view
perhaps most clearly by saying that human security
gives  national  security  a  new  dimension:  national
security  is  also  important  for  the  safety  of  citizens.
This means that only a certain dimension of national
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security can be reduced to human priorities. In this
way of thinking, national security and human welfare
are linked, but in a way that allows some indepen-
dence for both. There can be national security that is
neutral to human security, and there can be human
security separate from national security.
Furthermore,  human  security,  especially  its  eco-
nomic dimension, can be instrumental to national se-
curity. After the East Asian states assumed a state-
identity that emphasized the role of the state in the
promotion  of  prosperity  and  development,  national
security apparatuses of East Asia started promoting
the idea of pro-poor economic policies as a way to
secure  regime  legitimacy  and  fight  violence  chal-
lenges to the state. This was already the strategy of
the  Philippine  military  under  president  Ramon
Magsaysay in the 1950s [61,62], while it became a
strategy more widely accepted within the ASEAN after
the establishment of the organization [63–65], Devel-
opment became a way to pacify the people in China
after  the  ending  of  the  cultural  revolution:  as  in
ASEAN, economic grievances were tackled head-on,
instead of  using military means as the first  option.
The obsession to develop, rather than tackling polit-
ical grievances is obvious in the Chinese documents
of their policies in the restless provinces of Tibet and
Xinjiang [66,67].
In the East Asian human security debate the value
of  national  security  is  partly  independent  from  the
value of the nation, and since the nation is a vital in-
strument of human security, one cannot readily justify
compromising national security in the name of human
security. This way of linking "human" and "security" in
East  Asia  has  avoided  making  the  concept  a  justi-
fication  for  rebellions  or  for  intrusive  humanitarian
intervention.  The  strong  Japanese  role  in  the  artic-
ulation of the concept of human security must have
been  partly  motivated  by  this  East  Asian desire  to
divert the concept from its radical roots [60]. According
to the progressive input of the Commission for a New
Asia,  a  group  of  16  respected  Asian  intellectuals,
humanitarian  concerns  can  justify  intervention,  but
only as a last resort, for purely humanitarian purposes,
under  a  UN  mandate,  with  the  acceptance  of  the
population  of  the  country,  and  only  if  there  is  an
extreme threat  to  human security  and legality  [53].
The  fact  that  intervention  can  be  possible  only  in
extreme cases of threat to human security and legality
is  justified  by  the  fact  that  national  security  and
sovereignty are values in themselves.
Another  way  of  avoiding  reductionism  is  to  see
national  security  as  a  vital  instrument  of  human
security, although in certain countries and certain his-
torical periods the nation might seem a poor instru-
ment  of  human security.  An  international  normative
construction in which strong nations are not allowed to
interfere  in  the  domestic  affairs  of  smaller  nations
could be valuable for human security, since it is a con-
vention that generally yields value for human survival.
The latter  interpretation is often present in the East
Asian human security debate. According to the former
Japanese prime minister: "both threats to a sovereign
nation  and  the  international  system  also  clearly
threaten humanity and therefore the individual" [25].
The overall  East  Asian  diagnosis  of  the  relationship
between  national  and  human  securities  is  more
positive to the state, and this is understandable, taken
the  historical  context  of  East  Asia.  East  Asia's  last
great conflicts before the peaceful period after 1979
multiplied due to the lack of respect for sovereignty
and  the  principle  of  non-interference.  In  terms  of
human lives lost, two of these conflicts—the Korean
War  and  the  Vietnam  War—were  the  world's  most
serious conflicts after World War II. In Southeast Asia,
President  Sukarno's  radical  thinking  in  the  1960s
about the new emerging forces (communists and third
world  nationalists)  opposed  by  the  old  established
forces  (imperialists  and  neo-colonialists)  also  con-
structed a world with little respect for national sover-
eignty.  Sukarno's  disrespect  for  the  sovereignty  of
neighboring  countries  also  caused  insecurity  for
Malaysians  and  Singaporeans.  These  mistakes  were
formative  for  the  East  Asian  emphasis  on  peaceful
respect  for  sovereignty,  as  were  the  experiences of
ultra-nationalist  authoritarianism  for  European  inte-
gration-based peace. In addition to inter-state conflict,
an insufficient level of nation-building has also caused
intra-state  wars,  and  thus  many  Asian  intellectuals
feel  that  Asia  needs  a  strict  primacy  of  national
security.  According  to  ([53]  p.  53)  "Security  is  still
seen very much in terms of national security … (this
is) felt keenly in Asia because nation-building is still in
progress and national consciousness is high in most if
not all countries." Thus it is understandable that the
principle  that  human  security  does  not  in  normal
circumstances  justify  intervention  supports  the
normative and interpretative construct on which the
long peace of East Asia after 1979 and ASEAN peace
have been based.
On the level of  rhetoric, the Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation  [48]  could  be  considered  the  founding
document of both peace periods. Three out of the six
main  principles  of  this  document  emphasize  non-
interference and respect for sovereignty as common
rules  of  interaction  between  signatory  nations.  Ac-
cording to the Uppsala conflict data, Southeast Asian
countries  had  supported  each  other's  insurrections
militarily  29  times  before  they joined  ASEAN,  while
during the peaceful period after joining ASEAN, this
has not happened once. Clearly, a concept of security
that gives little excuse for threats to national security
rules the long peace of ASEAN. The same is true for
East Asia.  During the Cultural  Revolution and prole-
tarian  internationalism  in  China  (and  in  Pol  Pot's
Cambodia),  respect  for  sovereignty  was  not  part  of
the normative construct, and thus, states extensively
supported  each  other’s  insurrections—they  were
sometimes  seen  as  necessary  for  human  welfare,
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liberation and justice. The area witnessed 35 cases of
intervention  in  support  of  insurgents  that  fellow
Asians felt represented a better concept of justice and
security. However, once the long peace of East Asia
started  in  1979,  all  this  stopped.  Non-interference
therefore  seems  to  belong  to  the  successful  East
Asian peace strategy. Even though one could say that
non-interference also offers  political  elites  an oppor-
tunity to repress their populations in impunity, it is also
the case that in the peaceful period when East Asian
states respected national security objectives by avoid-
ing  military  intervention  into  each  other’s  internal
disputes,  pacification  has  also  lead  to  a  decline  in
authoritarian violence [68]. Thus, non-interference has
not  increased  the  authoritarian  threat  to  human
security.
Then, if military non-interference has clearly been
part of the successful normative construction of the
long peace of ASEAN and the long peace of East Asia
since  1979,  it  might  be  tempting  to  say  that  the
association  between  security  and  human  survival,
well-being  and  freedom  should  have  such  a  rela-
tionship to the concept of national security, that there
could  be  no justification  for  military  interference  in
domestic governance. Of course, non-interference is
not a necessary objective condition for peace, and the
current normative, identity-based and interpretational
constellation behind the relative peace in East Asia is
not unchanging, nor is it the only possible construc-
tion that can succeed in preserving peace. The long
peace of East Asia is not perfect. But still, it seems
that East Asian history has taught us some lessons
about  the  value  of  sovereignty  for  human security.
These lessons have given rise to local ownership of
the  norms  of  non-interference.  Thus,  one  should
probably  not  insist  on  interpretations  of  the  rela-
tionship between national and human security which
give  easy  justification  for  inter-state  military  inter-
vention.  An  articulation  of  the  values  of  human
security and national security as independent entities
and the assessment of the value of national security
for  human  security,  both  typical  to  the  East  Asian
human security debate, can therefore lead to a useful
increase in East Asian relative peace.
While the consequences of East Asian relationship
between "human" and "security" can be assessed from
the point of view of peace and war, it is also possible to
assess it from the point of view of power politics. If
human security does not facilitate legitimate human-
itarian  intervention,  it  means  that  citizens  cannot
expect  military  assistance  from outside  the  country
against their rulers. The East Asian concept of human
security  has  been  criticized  for  elitism:  an  Asia-
specific cultural context has been used to legitimize
the sanctity of even brutal elites against international
power. Protected by cultural diversity and the natural
acceptance  of  a  nation-based  international  system,
authoritarian  power  interests  legitimize  oppression
against their citizens [45]. At the same time, taken
that the international system is no more democratic
than that of the authoritarian countries, more intru-
sive  human  security  concepts  may  lend  support  to
international  authoritarianism,  as  was  experienced
during the "colonial protection of East Asian subjects"
or  during  the  international  occupation  of  Iraq  and
Afghanistan.  This  is  why  most  East  Asianist  voices
against the intrusive human security concept see such
concepts "as part of a 'West against the Rest' effort to
impose  individualistic  and  culturally  inappropriate
Western  notions  of  human  rights  and  humanitarian
intervention on the developing world" [35].
Even if the East Asian concept of human security
does not dominate national  security,  neither does it
constitute a reality within which national security can
dominate  human security.  The economic  survival  of
citizens  was  already  a  security  matter  at  the  time
when  several  East  Asian  countries  were  seeking
"comprehensive security". In these regimes (Thailand
since Prime Minister General Prem Tinsulanonda, post-
WWII Japan, South Korea since the 1970s, Suharto's
Indonesia, Magsaysay's Philippines and the Philippines
after 1986, and Deng Xiaoping's China) where devel-
opment was seen as a security issue, economic sui-
cides (like President Sukarno's trade embargo against
Singapore in 1965, the Burmese military's decision to
abolish the value of some legal tenders, and Pol Pot's
decision  to  demonetize  the  Cambodian  economy)
could not have been committed in the name of na-
tional  security.  Later  regimes  that  subscribe  to  the
principles  of  human security  have had difficulties  in
using  national  security  as  an  argument  for  political
repression.  Thus,  even  a  weak  concept  of  human
security  (one  that  does  not  dominate  national  se-
curity)  can  create  a  reality  where  the  survival  of
citizens takes on a greater priority. Internal security
acts and authoritarian control in the name of national
security mostly take place in countries where human
security  does not belong to the political  vocabulary.
Yet even in those countries where human security has
some value, the treatment of conflict areas often lacks
sensitivity  to  human security,  and  especially  to  the
political freedom aspects of it.
6. Conclusions
East Asian human security does not justify rebellion or
uninvited humanitarian interventions, due to the fact
that human security does not take priority over na-
tional security. The normative orientation that the East
Asian human security concept constitutes in relation
to humanitarian intervention seems useful for the long
peace of East Asia.
East Asian human security has a developmentalist
core: it is the developmental concerns of human sur-
vival that get the priority in terms of security issues.
This can present two problems.  On the one hand, if
military security and development are the core func-
tions  of  states,  these  priorities  can  easily  justify
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compromises in competition with democracy. Economic
efficiency could be seen as a reason for not opening
the political system up for greater participation. How-
ever, development in East Asia is increasingly seen as a
twin value to democracy within the context of modern-
ization  [55].  The  modern  missions  of  states  include
both the provision of development and an interest in
democratic governance. Thus, the economic content of
human security is likely to further the long peace of
East Asia, and also in the sense that it reduces author-
itarian violence. Still, a greater political content for the
concept  could  be  useful  in  light  of  the  historical
challenges  that  authoritarian  violence  has  posed  to
East Asian human security.
On the other hand, the emphasis on the concept
"economic" in East Asian developmentalism still poses
a challenge to human security, unless economic pri-
orities  cannot  be  considered on the  long term and
reconciled with the priorities of the environment. Fo-
cusing on environmental human security could offer a
great  new potential  for  East  Asian  human  security
debate. Such a focus would not stir the sensitivities
related to the norm of non-interference in East Asia,
and yet a focus on environmental security could be a
significant  contribution  to  positive  regional  cooper-
ation for human well-being.
In conclusion, therefore, the East Asian debate on
human security could create realities that strengthen
regional peace and well-being. Thus, if a concept pro-
motes progressive political realities, scholars ought to
endorse  it  regardless  of  the  analytical  implications.
Most of the complaints about the analytical value of
human security are related to the search for a mirror
image of reality. Yet, even as such, the problems of
the  concept  have been exaggerated.  Andrew Mack,
for example, claims that if one wishes to examine the
interconnections  between  war,  poverty  and  gover-
nance, then these variables should be defined in an
analytically  independent  manner  [35].  However,  the
concept of human security does not prevent catego-
ries  that  cut  across  or  disaggregate  the concept  of
human  security.  Conceptual  categories  that  reveal
similarities in one dimension do not imply similarity in
all  dimensions.  If  the  concept  of  human  security
lumps issues with different causal dynamics together,
then we will have to create concepts underneath the
conceptual umbrella of security that make it possible
to  develop  models  that  differentiate,  for  example,
between security threats generated by an intentional
enemy (such as a neighboring country or  an ethnic
group),  and  threats  that  arise  from non-intentional
sources  (such  as  the  environment).  If  different  se-
curity elements have causal connections with one an-
other (such as poverty and conflict), human security,
which covers both, does not, as a concept, prevent
analysis on the relationship between the two. Human
security does not make the sentence "poverty causes
conflict" a  tautology,  just  as the concept  "universe"
has so far not prevented us from studying relation-
ships between various, analytically separate elements
of the universe.
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